The special weekly Kassioun issue (last Thursday, April 24) devoted an article by the political editor to discussing “The Possibility of ISIS’s Return?” Events and statements that evening quickly confirmed the validity of the assessment Kassioun had presented at the time, which was reinforced over the following days.
For several weeks now, a protest movement has been emerging in some areas in northwestern Syria, trying to work against a Syrian-Turkish settlement. It has expressed itself in part by standing against the reopening of the “Abu al-Zandin” crossing, in addition to a number of other activities and events.
Official Syrian, Turkish, and Russian statements over the past week regarding the Syrian-Turkish settlement, made by the Syrian president, the Russian foreign minister, and Turkish officials, indicate that the gradual steps towards reaching a settlement, which have extended for more than two years starting with the Tehran summit of the Astana trio in July 2022, have come close to reaching a point of no return. This is represented by a meeting at the presidents’ level, which naturally will not be the end of the issue. Instead, it will form the basis for consensus that will be followed by the practical implementation of the steps of that consensus.
The People’s Will Party (PWP) took a supportive position for an Astana-sponsored Syrian-Turkish settlement from the outset of talking about this subject in mid-2022. It is not an exaggeration to say that the PWP was among the first to ponder this idea and its importance on the pages of Kassioun even before it was announced. Despite the usual and expected attacks from the enemies of the political solution on all sides, nevertheless, the PWP continued to defend, explain, and interpret its position through a number of articles and studies.
On Tuesday, April 18, the Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria (AANES) published a document entitled “An initiative to solve the Syrian crisis”. Those who issued the document called on the various Syrian forces to consider it.
It has now been three weeks since the earthquake catastrophe. While the space the disaster occupies in the media and politically is gradually receding, the reality reveals every day new depths of the disaster, as well as tremendous pain and suffering that is crushing the bones of (survivors), if it is correct to describe those who were not killed by the earthquake as survivors.
(The following article was originally published on geopolitika.ru website)
On Tuesday, February 14, a Russian MFA media release about a meeting between Mikhail Bogdanov, the Special Representative of the Russian President, and Kadri Jamil, one of the Syrian Opposition leaders, stated: “the Russian side stressed the need to establish practical cooperation between Damascus and Ankara in order to overcome the consequences of the earthquake on February 6.”
This statement confirms Russia’s pursuit of a Syrian-Turkish settlement, which over the seven months preceding the earthquake, was the main item on the agenda of the Astana Format (for Syria peace talks).
Nearly two weeks after the devastating earthquake that struck Syria and Turkey, seismographs are still recording aftershocks that usually occur after every major earthquake, the strength of which gradually decreases until it fades away. This is the opposite of what is happening on the humanitarian level, where the strength of the aftershocks increases on the humanitarian side in all the areas affected by the earthquake, especially those in Syria.
For the Syrian public, inside and outside Syria, the humanitarian aspect related to the earthquake disaster and the deep pain it left behind, as well as to their crisis that erupted 12 years ago, is always the most valued and important aspect, at least in its emotional and national side. For the political sides, especially the extremists, as well as for the external powers, especially the Western ones, the humanitarian aspect is the least important, and it is just a tool to pass policies.
For the second consecutive year, Turkey reduces the water level of Euphrates river, in this time of the year, resulting in the amounts of water flow across the river reduced by 40% of what was agreed upon in the last understanding between Turkey and Syria. Confining water and reducing its level have become frequent, but their impact and effect vary from one year to another according to the level of rainfall abundance. The country is left without comprehensive water management for decades which is disproportionate with the rapid water deterioration of Syria.
