Kassioun Editorial 1271: Once Again, Why A National Unity Government?

At the Syrian level, there is a clear connection between what happened in al-Suqaylabiyah and a series of preceding events: starting with the spark represented by Damascus Governorate Decision No. 311, which restricted the sale of alcohol to specific areas in Damascus characterized by a particular socioreligious identity; followed by the Bab Touma protest and the counter-protests in both Abbasiyyin Square and Arnous Square; and culminating in the al-Suqaylabiyah incident.

The “local” thread linking this series from beginning to end is that it revolved around dividing Syrians against one another along religious and sectarian lines (and also ethnic lines, if we add to the analysis the incident of bringing down the flag in Afrin and the tensions that followed). This thread is the division of Syrians based on secondary contradictions, far removed from the primary concern that unites 95% of Syrians of all ethnicities, religions, and sects: poverty, rising prices, the steadily deteriorating socioeconomic situation, and the absence of any real solutions to the major crises Syria faces—economically, politically, and in terms of security—not to mention the lack of any genuine political participation.

In other words, the escalation of efforts to pit Syrians against one another along ethnic, religious, and sectarian lines directly serves the interests of the major corruption actors and warlords from various domestic sides, who have no interest in uniting Syrians around their real interests, because the 5% would be the direct losers from such unity.

Expanding the lens to include the regional level allows for a more realistic view and reveals hidden intersection points between the local and regional levels. “Israel”, which previously declared in its media that it wants Syria to be the first example within the “Greater Israel” project—through partitioning it, fomenting of internal conflict, and occupying additional parts—has now begun speaking through official and semi-official channels about initiating implementation, including Ben-Gvir’s public threat to assassinate the Syrian transitional president.

When discussing the war on Iran, any reasonable analyst—including a significant number of American analysts—acknowledges that both the United States and “Israel” have become embroiled in a war of attrition they will inevitably lose. Such a loss would have major consequences at multiple levels, including the collapse of the “Greater Israel” project. This means that “Israel” will seek to compensate for the loss, as much as possible, and the easiest place (unfortunately) is Syria, because it is vulnerable in every sense: economically, politically, socially, and nationally.

Every additional act of tension along ethnic, religious, and sectarian lines accumulates and paves the way for future explosions, which may be very near, and must not be treated lightly or irresponsibly.

For all these reasons, we are before an extremely dangerous phase in the near term, and we have no means of defense except uniting our people and closing the gaps through which external sabotage and major internal corruption infiltrate, regardless of the labels or ideologies they claim.

The quick and only path to an urgent and genuine unification of Syrians in the face of these various dangerous possibilities is a real national unity government with actual powers, incorporating the main political and social currents in the country. This would be the first step toward a comprehensive general national conference through which Syrians can determine their own destiny.

This path is time-bound, and failing to embark on it within the objectively available timeframe—which is short—means inevitably taking a path of new explosions from which no Syrian side will emerge a winner, if at all.

(النسخة العربية)