How Do We Read the “New” European Policy Toward Syria?

The ministers attached to their letter what they called the “non-paper on Syria”, or in other words an unofficial paper on Syria, consisting of three pages, containing three sub-headings, respectively: Current situation (in Syria), (Current) EU Policy – State of Play (towards Syria), and Proposals.

The eight countries are: Austria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Greece, Italy, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.

The media, as well as various political sides, addressed this “new development” with a large number of articles and analyses, many of which went toward a common conclusion, the essence of which is that Syria is now on the path of returning to the past. That is, returning to pre-2011.

Kassioun Research Unit obtained the original documents of both the letter and the “non-paper”. In this article, we will analyze these two documents, by presenting the main content therein, analyzing it, and drawing conclusions based thereon.

First: Contents of the letter

In form, the first document is a brief one-page letter signed by the eight ministers and addressed to Borrell, dated July 15, 2024. The letter includes, in order: a brief overview of the current situation in Syria, how the situation has developed compared to 2017, the year the EU announced its Syria strategy, later known as the “Three NOs Strategy”, which remains the official strategy at the time of sending the letter. The “Three NOs” are: no to reconstruction, no to lifting sanctions, no to normalizing relations with the Syrian regime, before a comprehensive political solution is reached.

The senders then present their view that EU policy has not kept pace with developments since 2017, saying: “We believe it is high time to review and assess 1) the Strategy’s results achieved so far, 2) the effectiveness of our actions and instruments and 3) options to adjust our approach, based on the changed realities in and around Syria”.

The letter then concludes by saying: “Our goal is a more active, outcome-driven, and operational Syria policy. This would allow us to increase our political leverage, the effectiveness of our humanitarian assistance and early recovery approach, and contribute to achieving the conditions for safe, voluntary and dignified returns of Syrian refugees in accordance with UNHCR standards”.

Second: Contents of the “non-paper”

As mentioned above, the non-paper consists of three pages, containing three sub-headings: Current situation (in Syria), (Current) EU Policy – State of Play (towards Syria), and Proposals.

In assessing the current situation, there is sporadic talk about the deteriorating humanitarian situation that is continuously worsening. The talk focuses on three main points: the regime regaining control of up to 70% of Syrian territory, renormalization of relations with a number of Arab countries and the return to the Arab League, and the lack of any real progress in the political solution process and in the work of the UN special envoy.

Then the paper moves on to the conclusion that says: “Today, a political solution in line with UN resolution 2254 seems out of reach while the humanitarian crisis is becoming worse coupled with the imminent economic collapse”.

We will not rush to jump to conclusions, but it is useful to quickly point out that the code word in any strategy presented by any country is the declared method of its assessment of the current situation, because that assessment itself implicitly carries a specific vision of what should be done. When it is said that “a political solution in line with UN resolution 2254 seems out of reach”, this means exactly: “forget this decision, and let’s look for an alternative path”, and the ‘alternative path’ is what we will present as our ‘proposals’ for the new strategy”.

Returning to the non-paper, and after laying the foundation in the “Current situation” section – or rather through one main sentence that is the core of this paragraph (i.e., assessing that “2254 seems out of reach”) – the non-paper moves to the second section, Current “EU Policy – State of Play”. In this section, there is an intensive review of the strategy announced by the EU in 2017 towards Syria, and implicitly the objectives and tools of that strategy. Next, there is an assessment, the main content of which is that this policy has failed to achieve any of its objectives, which paves the way for the final section, the “Proposals”.

The “Proposals” section consists of 10 questions, phrased in a manner that make it answers more than questions.

The main outcome of these questions is a proposal to appoint an EU special envoy to engage with Damascus, to begin gradually restoring diplomatic relations, and to reconsider the issue of supporting the “moderate opposition”, and practically to end this support (this is completely consistent with setting aside 2254). Additionally, there is talk about gradually lifting sanctions, intensifying work on the issue of early recovery, etc.

Third: The weight and role of these eight countries

Some of those clinging to the wind within the Syrian opposition, especially those organically linked to the West and who built their political project – assuming they have a project – on the aid, assistance, and support of the West, go so far as to diminish the weight and meaning of the letter and non-paper based on the weight of the countries that sent it, within the EU and globally.

The “downplaying the letter and non-paper” is based on the fact that the eight signatory countries are second- and third-tier countries within the EU structure. That is, if first-tier countries are ones like Germany and France (and formerly Britain), then the second-tier countries in terms of weight and influence include Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, and the Scandinavian countries, and in the third-tier come Eastern European countries.

According to this classification, which is very real in terms of capabilities and influence, the eight countries include three of the second-tier, five of the third-tier, and none of the first-tier. If we acknowledge with others the relative low weight and influence of these countries on the European scene, let alone internationally, it is useful to take an additional step in thinking, and perhaps another minute of thinking is enough, to reach a more fundamental conclusion.

The relative low weight of these countries, and an examination of the history of their policies towards our region, policies that are completely aligned with the American primarily, even more than they are with the official EU policy, pushes us towards a clear conclusion, which is that this “new policy” is not a kind of independence tendency of these countries. Quite the opposite, this policy is an indication of higher degrees of dependence, especially on the American, for which these countries today constitute the media-political preparation group for its policies that it has been working on, with the British at least, since 2016, that is, starting from the moment the British announced their transition from the policy of “toppling the regime” to the policy of “changing the regime’s behavior”.

Fourth: Is this really a “new” policy?

To put things in perspective, any policy must be read in a continuous time context, not as an emergency in a vacuum.

In this context, we invite the reader to review the reports published by the US-based Rand Institute over a period of three years between 2017 and 2019, entitled “Peace for Syria”, which Kassioun considered at the time and clarified their essence since. Among several articles on the subject, we recommend reviewing the following two: Regarding “Caesar”, “RAND”, and the Northeast and the Kurdish-Kurdish Dialogue; and “Rand – al-Nusra” is Pandora’s Box (in Arabic).

The gist of this report – by pure coincidence! – says that a comprehensive solution is out of reach, and therefore, partial solutions should be sought from the bottom up. Also, again by pure coincidence, the gist of this report is to work on “decentralization”, “early recovery”, “local governance”, etc.

The same RAND report came as a “scientific” argument to defend the new policy at the time, which was truly new. That is, the policy followed by the US and Britain (and Europe by extension), which was based on the idea of ​​“changing the regime’s behavior” instead of “toppling it”, which was no longer possible in any way after the direct Russian entry at the end of 2015 (assuming that it was an actual goal before that).

This same topic has been discussed at length in several Kassioun articles, including the following that we invite the reader to review: 1- What Does the West’s Behavior Change Towards the Regime Mean?; 2- Where is the Process of “Changing the Regime’s Behavior”? Context… Tools, Results; 3- From “Changing the Regime’s Behavior” to “Step for Step”, Where Are the Under-the-Table Agreements with the West Today?; 4- Three Tracks and Two Poles: “Strategic Dialogue”, “Astana”, and “Behavior Change”.

Fifth: The crux of the new-old policy

To present an abridged picture of what we referred to above, we will use a somewhat brief quote from a Kassioun article dating back to September 2021, which contains a condensed presentation of what we understand by the policy of “changing the regime’s behavior”, which itself subsequently evolved through the use of the project called “step for step,” as well as “early recovery”, “safe and neutral environment”, “local governance”, “decentralization”, and now “the new European policy”.

The quote:

First: The Western countries’ adoption of the slogan “overthrowing the regime” is fundamentally different from adoption of the same slogan by some of Syrian protestors. For the West, this slogan was not, in any way, intended to bring about real change in which the Syrian people determine their own destiny. Quite the contrary, the actual experience in Syria and elsewhere proves that the aim was to overthrow the entire state (as happened in Iraq and Libya).

Second: The transition from the discourse of “overthrowing the regime” to talking about “changing its behavior” practically began since mid-2016, and was initiated by Britain, and then became a unified discourse among Westerners.

Third: The historical framework for this transition from “overthrowing” to “behavior change” is the direct Russian military intervention, after months of which and the quick results it achieved against ISIS particularly, it became clear that it would prevent the collapse of the state in the same manner that happened in Iraq and Libya.

Fourth: Despite the West’s awareness of this matter, it continued to maintain the same objective and changed the tools, where the long-term militaristic attrition has become the primary tool in finishing off the country.

Fifth: The formation of the Astana tripartite, and its ability – through the de-escalation zones – to reduce the level of combat to the minimum, prompted the West to change the tools again towards economic attrition, and in this context, they benefited greatly from the decay and corruption of the prevailing system’s structure and its active participation in the attrition of Syria and Syrians. The West also benefited from the de facto partition, to which it effectively contributed by continuing to try to prevent the termination of al-Nusra and its attempts to whitewash it, and through the continuation of US military presence in the northeast.

Sixth: Reading the economic situation in Syria during the last few years allows us to discern the recent transition that we have referred to, that is, the shift of the center of gravity of the West’s work towards economic attrition, of which “Caesar” constitutes one of the main headings. In this context, during the years 2019 and 2020, the speed of economic collapse in Syria reached 34 times the average speed of economic collapse from the end of 2012 to the end of 2018.

Seventh: In our opinion, the West’s targeting (and the American-British-Zionist in particular) in Syria, before and after 2011, was on two levels: an upper limit of terminating its existence as a geopolitical unit, and a lower limit of terminating its functional role, which is translated by the position from The Zionist in particular. If reaching the upper limit has become very difficult with the presence of Russia on the ground, and the influence of the Astana tripartite, the security of the countries thereof is directly threatened by the division of Syria, then the lower limit is still achievable from the West’s point of view. Saying it more clearly: extracting Syria from the anti-Zionist stance is the essence of the practical translation of the slogan “changing the regime’s behavior”.

Putting things in order, the following can be said:

• The “concessions” and “facilitations” offered by the US, especially those related to Caesar, are, as the US itself says, coupled with “changing the regime’s behavior”.
• The American and Zionist understanding of changing the regime’s behavior revolves around rearranging the region in a manner suitable with the process of US withdrawal and repositioning in the greater conflict with China.
• If we use the same language as that of the “Caesar Act”, one of the objectives of the sanctions is to create “a government in Syria that respects…peaceful co-existence with its neighbors”.
• Rearranging the region within this meaning bears clear headings: The mobilization of the normalizing and non-normalizing Arab regimes in one field against Iran, Turkey and Russia; and the integration of the Zionist into this system as an ally.

Sixth: Essential conclusions

If any political side, including us as the People’s Will Party, have any hopes or expectations about the possibility of reaching a real solution to the Syrian crisis through some form of American-Russian consensus, then this possibility has become zero even a few years before Ukraine. This is particularly so after forming the Astana track and after Washington’s complete transition, and with it the Europeans by extension, to the policy of “changing the regime’s behavior”, the essence of which we explained above.

Moreover, American policy, especially in Syria, has for many years been focused on what James Jeffrey, the former US envoy to Syria, had previously announced, with his usual frankness and impudence, when he said: “My mission in Syria is to turn it into a quagmire for the Russians”, and when he confirmed more than once that from Washington’s point of view: “stalemate is stability”. Meaning that the continuation of the crisis for as long as possible is the best thing that Washington aspires to with regard to Syria.

A realistic understanding of things, far from desires and wishes, puts Syrian patriots, including those within the opposition and the regime, on one path with no alternative to get Syria out of its tragedy, and to prevent that tragedy from developing towards sustaining the division, to end Syria’s geopolitical presence completely, as has happened more than once in the history of several countries in the world.

This path is “only 2254 and nothing else…in its entirety and now!” This same path cannot be entered into or reached except by cutting off any hope in the West, and even by removing it from the entire picture of the solution if possible, and relying on cooperation with those countries that have a real interest in a solution and stability. Those countries are themselves threatened by the American comprehensive hybrid chaos, and by those we mean primarily the three Astana countries, along with China and key Arab countries, most notably Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

(النسخة العربية)