Skip to main content

Articles (322)

الأربعاء, 08 أيلول/سبتمبر 2021 19:33

7 Questions Regarding the “Arab” Gas Pipeline

The past few weeks have witnessed a lot of talk about what is being called the “Arab Gas Pipeline”, which is supposed to start from Egypt, going through Jordan, to Syria and Lebanon. Additionally, one of the pipeline’s branches will reach – according to the Egyptian media – between the Egyptian Arish and occupied Ashkelon, with the possibility of an additional branch reaching Iraq.

During the past ten years, Syrian society has produced very diverse forms of what can be classified within the general framework of the term “popular movement”. Nevertheless, the only form that has achieved “media recognition” is demonstrating.

Two weeks following what was considered a “sudden withdrawal” by the US from Afghanistan, readings and analyses of the situation are still pouring in. We will look here only at one dimension of the issue, and that is the one relating to the movement of terrorist or extremist elements (or as the mainstream western media likes to call them “jihadists”), in general and from a Syrian perspective.

What is the reality you imagine when the executive authorities in a country talk about topics such as: alternative energy, service automation, and attracting investment? Such topics can be sub-tasks in the agenda of a region or local government within a stable country. However, surprisingly, they are main topics in Syria 2021: the year that is witnessing the most severe socio-economic collapse within the ten years of the greatest humanitarian disaster after WW2!

In 2017, the World Health Organization estimated that nearly 3 million people in Syria are war-injured, and are suffering from disabilities at different levels. That is, nearly 15% of the population in Syria back then were living with the pain and the direct consequences of war on their bodies. The vast majority of them are forgotten, and they are not surrounded by any “special care” or compensation, not even by the cameras of international organizations.

Nearly a week has passed since the world watched events unfold and at a somewhat dubiously high pace following the so-called US “sudden withdrawal” from Afghanistan. It was no surprise that the reverberations of those events were in a way greater and louder beyond the borders of Afghanistan than in Afghanistan itself. In many parts of the world, most certainly ours, the same basic questions arose especially with Washington’s “allies” (whether or not they have declared themselves so): “Will our turn come?”, “When will it be our turn and how?”, and “What should we do in anticipation?”

Reactions to the Afghan events are still ongoing in and around Afghanistan and throughout the world, and perhaps the reactions outside Afghanistan are many times greater than inside it. That is understandable because what happened there, and what will happen, is closely connected to the nature of American policy in the context of its competition and conflict with the rising powers. It is also closely connected to the mechanisms by which those competing forces deal with the Afghan events, and this is subsequently connected to the overall international balance and its transformations, the effects of which reach all parts of the world.
Hereinbelow, we will try to present a set of questions that we believe the Afghan events have urgently put on the global discussion table, including those related to our region and our country, Syria. However, we should first provide a quick description of what happened, not from the news side of course, but somewhat the analytical side.

There is a striking phenomenon in the Syrian statistics in recent years, which is: a large increase in the proportion of GDP devoted for investment. That is, a larger part of the income produced annually goes to local investment, while a smaller proportion goes to consumption, whether private consumption that household consumption constitutes most of it, or public consumption spent by the government.

الخميس, 19 آب/أغسطس 2021 14:04

The Living Expenses in July 2021: 1.5 Million per Month

The living expenses of a family of five in Damascus have increased in mid-2021 to reach 1240 thousand Syrian pounds. That is according to Kassioun’s index based on 8 basic needs: food, housing, transportation, healthcare, clothing, education, household furniture, telecommunication, in addition to a proportion of 8% for other emergency needs.

The production of electricity in Syria is becoming an important indicator of the level of economic deterioration. While those concerned with the energy sector (producing and generating oil and gas) talk about prospects for the future amidst deterioration, indicators related to the political economic structure of contracts and partnerships limit the serious possible improvement in the situation of electricity production.

الصفحة 11 من 23