Has the Magnitude of Astana’s Insistence on the Syrian-Turkish Settlement Been Measured?

Has the Magnitude of Astana’s Insistence on the Syrian-Turkish Settlement Been Measured?

The intense work carried out by the Astana tripartite to reach a Syrian-Turkish settlement has entered the phase of high activity since the end of last year. As is known and stated, many security meetings took place between Syria and Turkey in Moscow over the past year, and even before that. However, the first meeting with a clear political dimension was that of the defense ministers of Syria, Turkey, and Russia in Moscow, on Wednesday, December 28, 2022.

That meeting clearly signaled that the Syrian-Turkish settlement process had entered the full implementation stage. At the meeting the general timetable was announced, which includes meetings of the foreign ministers and the presidents.

The extremists who rejected this settlement used the various tools at their disposal to obstruct and delay this settlement and, if possible, undermine it. Among the most important tools they tried to use are the following:

First: They tried to wreak havoc among the Astana parties themselves, especially between Iran on the one hand and Russia and Turkey on the other, by suggesting that Iran had been excluded and is not part of the process – this was especially after the tripartite meeting of defense ministers. This attempt was contained by Iran formally joining the settlement efforts and official meetings, including at the level of deputy foreign ministers, and more recently at the level of defense ministers. Indeed, Iran is clearly carrying out high-level diplomatic activity with the aim of resolving the complexities and problems and pushing towards accelerating and accomplishing the settlement.

Second: Official and semi-official media, as well as some official statements, worked to provide the necessary pretext for thwarting the settlement through numerous “fiery” statements. However, these statements were practically ignored and not allowed to be converted into a basis for thwarting the settlement.

Third: The Americans and the West tried to present the Arab activity as an alternative and opposite to Astana’s activity. In this context, the UAE was used in particular, and Jordan to a lesser extent, based on what is called “step for step” and “changing the regime’s behavior”. However, these attempts also failed and will fail considering the Saudi-Iranian settlement, and in light of the high level of understanding among Russia, China, and Saudi Arabia, which will allow enclosing the Syrian crisis from various sides without leaving any loopholes for the Americans and Zionists, especially by the main Arab countries playing the objective role required of them in contributing to the Syrian settlement.

Fourth: All possible stalling means have been and will be used, including complicating the course of the process by dividing it into many gradual levels, in addition to postponement means due to various reasons.

Fifth: Certain Syrian opposition circles, including Western and in particular American-British backed ones, have worked to organize events in northern Syria and around the world, in addition to intensive media work, all against the Syrian-Turkish settlement, including an attempt to pressure Turkey from inside.

Sixth: Americans and Western officials have repeatedly declared their rejection of this settlement and threatened to tighten sanctions. Moreover, they threatened Turkey itself with additional sanctions packages. Not to mention their attempts to create a new “Syrian opposition” of a special type, whose center this time is the US, and characterized by two things: an anti-Turkey position, and peaceful towards “other neighboring countries”, and this peace mainly means the Zionist entity.

It suffices to look simultaneously at the amount of effort exerted by the West and by the Syrian extremists against the Syrian-Turkish settlement, on the one hand, and to consider, on the other hand, the number of steps taken by the Astana tripartite towards this settlement, in order to know the extent of determination to achieve it.

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In this context, it is useful to recall the most important stages that have taken place thus far within the settlement process, starting with the Turkish President’s statement that there is an intention to meet with the Syrian President within the framework of a settlement between the two countries:

15 December 2022: A statement by the Turkish President that he proposed to the Russian President organizing a tripartite meeting at the presidential level, preceded by meetings among the foreign ministers, defense ministers, and heads of intelligence.

28 December 2022: A tripartite meeting of the defense ministers of Syria, Turkey, and Russia in Moscow.

29 December 2022: Statement by the Turkish Foreign Minister in which he announced plans for holding a meeting with his Russian and Syrian counterparts.

14 January 2023: A visit by the Iranian Foreign Minister to Syria, during which he stated in a joint press conference with his Syrian counterpart support for the ongoing efforts within the framework of the Syrian-Turkish settlement.

16 January 2023: A call between the Turkish and Russian presidents about the Syrian-Turkish settlement.

17 January 2023: A visit by the Iranian Foreign Minister to Turkey, during which he expressed in a joint press conference with his Turkish counterpart Iran’s gratitude for the ongoing work within the framework of the Syrian-Turkish settlement.

18 January 2023: A statement by the Russian Foreign Minister that preparations for a meeting between the Syrian and Turkish foreign ministers are underway with Russian mediation.

29 January 2023: A statement by the Turkish President that Iran could join the ongoing meetings within the framework of reaching a Syrian-Turkish settlement.

31 January 2023: A statement by the Russian Foreign Minister that an agreement has been reached about Iran’s participation in the efforts towards a Syrian-Turkish settlement.

1 February 2023: A statement by the Spokesperson of the Turkish Presidency on looking forward towards Iran’s participation in the ongoing discussions about a Syrian-Turkish settlement.

23 February 2023: A statement by the Special Representative of the President of Russia for the Middle East that work is continuous to achieve a Syrian-Turkish settlement and work is underway to hold a quadripartite meeting of the foreign ministers.

24 February 2023: A statement by the Iranian Foreign Ministry’s Spokesperson that the Syrian-Turkish settlement much be achieved soon.

4 March 2023: A call between the Turkish and Russian foreign ministers to discuss the Syrian-Turkish settlement.

8 March 2023: A statement by the Special Representative of the President of Russia for the Middle East that Russia and Turkey want to hold a quadripartite meeting in Moscow at the deputy foreign ministers’ level aiming to prepare for a meeting of the foreign ministers; everyone has been invited, awaiting responses from the Syrian and Iranian sides.

8 March 2023: A visit by the Iranian Foreign Minister to Turkey, during which he stated that work is underway on the Syrian-Turkish settlement.

8 March 2023: A statement by the Turkish Foreign Minister that work is underway for holding a quadripartite meeting of the foreign ministers.

9 March 2023: A visit by the Iranian Foreign Minister to Syrian.

14 March 2023: An official statement by the Kremlin regarding the upcoming meeting between the Russian and Syrian presidents in Moscow; a statement by the Special Representative of the President of Russia for the Middle East that preparations are underway to hold a meeting for the deputy foreign ministers of Syria, Turkey, Russia, and Iran.

15-16 March 2023: A delegation headed by the Syrian President, including the Defense and Foreign Ministers and other officials, visits Moscow and holds meeting at the various levels represented in the delegation (last meeting between the two presidents was in Moscow in September 2021); a statement by the Russian side that the Syrian-Turkish settlement was discussed.

16 March 2023: A statement by the Russian Presidency Spokesperson that communications are ongoing about a meeting between the Syrian and Turkish presidents.

20 March 2023: A statement by the Turkish Foreign Minister in which he expressed hope that quadripartite (Syrian, Turkish, Russian, and Iranian) negotiations will be held about the Syrian file.

21 March 2023: A statement by the Special Representative of the President of Russia for the Middle East in which he said that there are ongoing discussions with Syria, Turkey, and Iran about the quadripartite meeting at the Deputy Foreign Ministers level, and said that one of the objectives of the meeting is to prepare for a meeting at the Foreign Ministers’ level.

25 March 2023: A call between the Turkish and Russian presidents about the Syrian-Turkish settlement.

27 March 2023: A statement by the Special Representative of the President of Russia for the Middle East in which he said that there are ongoing preparations for the quadripartite meeting of the deputy foreign ministers of Syria, Turkey, Russian, and Iran.

29 March 2023: A visit by the Iranian Foreign Minister to Moscow and a meeting with his Russian counterpart.

3 April 2023: Preparatory consultations of the delegations of the deputy foreign ministers of Syria, Turkey, Russia, and Iran, in Moscow.

4 April 2023: A quadripartite meeting of the Foreign Deputy Ministers of Syria, Turkey, Russia, and Iran, in Moscow.

5 April 2023: A statement by the Turkish Foreign Minister in a press conference in Brussels that a quadripartite meeting at the foreign ministers’ level will be held in Moscow.

7 April 2023: A meeting between the Turkish and Russian foreign Ministers in Ankara, followed by a statement by the Russian Foreign Minister that preparations are underway to hold a quadripartite meeting of the foreign ministers.

9 April 2023: The Russian Ambassador in Damascus talked in an interview about the quadripartite meeting at the foreign ministers’ level and said that calls and consultations are ongoing among the sides about the matter.

10 April 2023: A statement by the Special Representative of the President of Russia for the Middle East that there are preparations to hold a ministerial meeting of Syria, Turkey, Russian, and Iran soon.

10 April 2023: A statement by the Turkish Foreign Minister that the quadripartite ministerial meeting on the Syrian file will be held in Moscow in May, during which there will be preparations for a meeting at the presidential level.

19 April 2023: A meeting between the Special Representative of the President of Russia for the Middle East and the Iranian Ambassador in Moscow within the efforts of preparing to hold a quadripartite meeting of the foreign ministers regarding the Syrian file.

24 April 2023: In an interview with the Turkish Foreign Minister, he said that there is still a possibility of a meeting between the Turkish and Syrian presidents; the Turkish Defense Minister also made statements in the media that a quadripartite meeting will be held in Moscow the next day at the level of defense ministers and heads of intelligence.

25 April 2023: A quadripartite meeting of the defense ministers and heads of intelligence of Syria, Turkey, Russia, and Iran, in Moscow.

26 April 2023: Statement by the Iranian and Turkish defense ministers, and an official press statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry about the quadripartite meeting the previous day, these included confirmation that the objective is a Syrian-Turkish settlement and solving the Syrian crisis.

Summary

The reader should not forget that what we have mentioned above is only the tip of the iceberg. It is known that any regular official meeting between two countries requires preparations at lower levels that may include direct meetings and intensive communications. So, we can only imagine the amount of work expended in arranging a meeting at the level of four countries, and the magnitude of effort when there are several meetings at various levels: at the levels of heads of intelligence, defense ministers, deputy foreign ministers, foreign ministers, and presidents.

This means that the work on the Syrian-Turkish settlement on the part of the Astana tripartite is work taking place literally around the clock. It is not difficult to conclude that this reflects a deep conviction of the necessity of this settlement on the one hand, and also reflects the existence of a clear agreement among the Astana tripartite on certain timeframes that are the maximum deadlines to achieve this settlement. These timeframes are not linked to Turkish elections in any way, but are primarily linked to the agreement among these countries on the need to expel the Americans from the region, and the necessity of a real settlement of the Syrian crisis that guarantees stability therein, and guarantees that it will not be a quagmire for these three forces.

(Arabic version)