Is the “Special Military Operation” Over?

Why a “special operation”?

It seems that we are on the verge of the end of the “special military operation”; that is, on the verge of its transformation into a war. This is what we will discuss next, but first it is necessary to ponder the meanings and implications of naming the battle a “special operation”, because these same meanings will enable understanding what is meant by the end of that operation and its transition to something higher and larger.

In our opinion, and according to the multifaceted realities the world has experienced over the past six months, the meaning of “special military operation” is limited to the following:

First: The number of Russian armed troops participating in the “operation” is limited (so far it does not exceed 15% of the total active military force). Same goes with the types of weapons used (more advanced missiles have not actually been used, and what has been used was used only once and symbolically, having political goals more than military ones; and even at the level of tanks, for example, the newer tanks have not been used yet, especially the advanced types like the Armata. There are many other examples in the same context).

Second: The nature of the combat doctrine – including the nature of the targets – is derived from the concrete tasks set for the operation within the Ukrainian domain; particularly, removing the Donbass region (Donetsk and Luhansk) from the Ukro-Nazi regime’s control, and taking away the definite danger coming from NATO across the Ukrainian borders. According to these tasks, the rapid invasion during the first month, followed by a rapid retreat became understandable. (Western military analysts now agree that the incursion and retreat at the beginning of the operation was a well-thought-out thing aiming to cause the widest possible destruction of the military infrastructure throughout Ukraine, and to allow later advancing within the Donbass without major difficulties, to control a large part thereof. The process of destroying the military infrastructure has been achieved to a large extent, which made the task difficult for the West, and was reflected in opening wide and uninterrupted supply lines of which there is no example in history except the Zionist entity’s supply lines, especially during the 1973 war).

Third: Although the entire Western media machine has mobilized to work against Russia, one can clearly note that the defamation of “crimes and atrocities committed by Russians in Ukraine” were minimal, to the extent that “accidents” that Western media blasted as crimes against civilians could be counted with two hands. This reflects the nature of the Russian military action in Ukraine, which strives to avoid targeting civilians (this raises a point that it is worth looking for the truth of what was happening in Syria and the methods of military action therein, of which the Russians were not the only one in control). In any case, this also falls within the concept of a “special operation”, which deals with the operations area as an area with a large pro-Russian majority population; this applies to Donbass and some other regions in eastern and southern Ukraine, but not to western Ukrainian.

Kharkov and partial mobilization

The Ukrainian penetration of the Kharkov region – at least in the media – constituted an important juncture in the special military operation, after which a Russian decision was issued to partially mobilize 300,000 reserve troops. The chronological sequence between the two events led to the first being considered the main and fundamental cause of the second. However, we think things are more complex than that. On the one hand, there are major exaggerations about the size and importance of the Ukrainian penetration that took place, which in terms of area does not exceed – according to maximum Western estimates – 2.5% of the area initially controlled by the Russians (about 3000 sq km out of 120000 sq km). Not to mention the long and costly preparation of this Ukrainian attack by NATO, and by the US and Britain in particular, by their own admission, and the human losses of the Ukrainian forces therefrom. However, all this does not negate that a partial setback occurred within the special military operation, and certainly contributed to the partial mobilization decision, but it is certainly not the only reason and perhaps not the main one.

In addition to this setback, we can expect a host of other reasons, including the arrival of winter – the traditional ally of the Russians – as it has become clear that the process of European and Western economic deterioration had begun to cross acritical threshold. The most important indicators of that were the beginning of popular movements in Europe, which were not limited to protesting against inflation and declining living conditions, but rather started protesting the sanctions against Russia and the European subservience to the US. The protests can only be expected to increase in momentum in the coming weeks and months. Perhaps this in itself is one of the main reasons why the Americans, and with them the subservient European elite, desperately needed to achieve some kind of victory against Russia, after a series of military, economic, and political defeats over the past months. Perhaps, as winter approaches, this victory could provide temporary supplies of mental warmth, allowing continuation of the battle during the winter.

Undoubtedly, the Russian economy has also been affected by all the crises striking the world, and by the unprecedented Western sanctions. Nevertheless, the extent of the damage inflicted on Russia is almost the least in the entire world, if we compare it with that on the West as a whole, and even on China, India, and the rest of the world. Explaining this does not require a special economic and geopolitical genius; Russia, with its area of 17 million sq km, and its natural resources (oil, gas, minerals, grain, etc.), is a country of the kind that cannot be practically besieged if there is an internal political will to confront the blockade.

Anyone who has read 20th century history knows that 14 Western countries directly intervened in the Russian civil war between 1918 and 1921, and tried to suffocate Russia and besiege it from all sides, yet were unable to do so. Since then, it has become clear to Western mind that its hegemony over the world is impossible without dismantling Russia/ the Soviet Union from within, and without appropriating the underground resources it possesses, which is estimated at 40% of the world total, (and implicitly, all the elements of Mandeleev’s table are present in Russia; among them, in particular, are rare metals that are indispensable in all advanced and military industries, as well as inert gases, of the global stockpile of which Russia possesses 80%. Meaning, the West needs Russia’s resources to fight Russia).

This element of potential power, in the geopolitical and resources sense, only a small part thereof has been used thus far (gas and oil in particular). The transition to mobilizing resources on the basis of a comprehensive battle with the West, an existential battle, requires a situation different from the current one inside Russia. In history, great internal changes have always occurred in conditions of war and not in conditions of peace, because conditions of war, along with the will of survival and victory, push towards a comprehensive mobilization of resources, and towards popular mobilization of the people. This and that cannot take place amid control of local and international plunderers over the economy and media joined within the concerned country.

End of the operation, beginning of the war

All indicators now say that the special operation has ended or is about to; meaning that it is transitioning to the level of a war, including operations to annex Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson to Russia.

In parallel, the chances of the war spreading beyond Ukraine have become more realistic than any other time. Perhaps the latest statements of China’s president about the need for China to be prepared for a “real war” go in the same direction, and give a clear indication about the nature of Chinese alignment within the imminent or possible “real war”.

More importantly, the war that can spread outside and widely, will start inside Russia itself. That is, the comprehensive mobilization processes of the resources and the people, will impose socioeconomic decisions, atop of which are those that are can no longer be evaded, targeting the Russia oligarch positions, especially the Zionist ones, primarily in the economy and the media.

The outcome of the imminent comprehensive war, whatever its military intensity and levels beyond Russia, will be resolved inside Russia. Either there will be victory through transitioning to a new socioeconomic model that turns the war into a popular war adopted by Russians to the end, as their own war, the war of the Russian people, and necessarily leads to dealing a final blow to US hegemony and the birth of a new world, or a full defeat that leads to ending Russia’s existence and comprehensive fragmentation that is immeasurably worse than what happened in 1991 and extending US hegemony over the world. In the latter case, the US will initiate a rapid and widespread application of Neo-Malthusianism over the entre world, and will leave – without exaggeration – billions of victims around the world, primarily using the tools of hunger and disease, and to a lesser degree inter- and intra-state wars. Therefore, there is no choice for Russia and China, and practically the entire world, except victory and mobilizing whatever is need to achieve it.

 (النسخة العربية)