The Constitutional Committee: The Wheels are Ready to Spin, and the Brakes are being Removed

Although the first round of the CC – in both its large and small group formats – which took place between 30 October and 8 November, seemed positive; nevertheless, the failure of the second round and postponement of the third (which was supposed to start on 16 December (2019)) has reaffirmed a clear fact: the hardliners against whose will the CC formed, and who stalled and tried to delay of the CC formation for two years, they cannot also be the ones who drive the formed CC towards accomplishing its tasks and playing its role as a door opener for the political process and full implementation of UNSC resolution 2254.

Looking from the outside, starting from a few days before the second round, then during and a few days thereafter, the scene can be described as one filled with intense sabotage. During that period, the hardliners on both sides sought, in a bizarre implicit agreement, to do everything in their power to kill and bury the CC as quickly as possible.

What actually happened was that the sabotage wave was absorbed at the outset, by staying quiet about it during the second round and a little thereafter. That silence was an opportunity and a test of the veracity of the intentions and practices. This silence formally continues until now, but behind the scenes a lot of movement is taking place and it can be summarized in two main points:

First, failure of the Constitutional Committee is forbidden.

Second, those who have clearly and concretely demonstrated their subversive intentions, whether individuals or entities, will very soon have a lesser weight in the process as a whole.

Pending Issues

Parallel to the subversive behavior by some within the regime and others in the opposition with regards to the CC, the problem of the representation of northeastern Syria persists.

In this context, we can look at four implications of dialogue by SDF / SDC: the first is a dialogue with the regime, the second is with the opposition, the third is with the Kurdish National Council (KNC) and through it with the Kurdistan Region, and the fourth is with Ankara.

Taking an overview look of these dialogues – discussions of achieving thereof having never stopped, especially after the Turkish aggression and the partial American withdrawal then return – we see that none of them has progressed in earnest, and shape of the process remained like a pendulum swinging between going for dialogue and withdrawing from it. Meanwhile, the essence of the process has always been not taking any complete steps that would allow solving the problem.

It is known that pushing for the representation of the Northeast in the political process, whether it comes through dialogue with the opposition or through dialogue with the KNC or through dialogue with the regime with Russian sponsorship, will ultimately serve the goal of preserving Syrian unity. Insisting on proclaiming that SDF / SDC as a having nothing to do with neither the regime nor the opposition, nor having it represented within the CC and the political process, is insistence on deepening the isolation of northeastern Syria in general, and the Kurds in particular.

In other words, reinforcing that isolation would reinforce the illusions of secession, and deepen the misunderstanding and diminishing trut between the political and popular components regarding the legitimacy and patriotism (of the special conditions) of the northeast.

The clear American targeting has deepened this isolation. This is clearly consistent with the overall American plot in the region, which today is based on a set of foundations, perhaps the most important of which is that what is required is a rapid withdrawal from the region, but that allows it to plunge into more chaos, so that it remains an arena for exhausting opponents.

The tangible part of this American action is partial withdrawals and repositioning, so that the focus will be on the most intense and most susceptible files to play the role of detonators, the Kurdish question being on the top of those, in Iraq and in Syria alike, as well as using sectarian issues that remain an important exploitation tool against an interest of the region’s populations. The latter issue requires the revival of ISIS again, the tremors of which we see primarily in Iraq, but also in Syria.

Inevitable Changes

As is the case with the regime and the opposition, and the inevitable changes within their structures and representations – at least those directly relating to the political process – in a way that impairs and isolates sabotage efforts, a similar matter with regard to SDF / SDC also falls under the category of those thing that are inevitable.

The weight of the rationalists, especially those who are not blinded by the American lies and promises, should increase. This is particularly important since it has become difficult for anyone to believe that there exist levels of foolishness with which a person or a political power or a group within a political power, no matter how foolish, can continue to believe American lies.

The Wheels Will Spin Soon

If the apparent state of calm is what dominated the scene in the past one month or so, the wheels will soon spin again. However, this time – and after the tests that took place during the past period – the artificial brakes that some wanted to be part of the wheel itself will be eliminated. This is where matters are heading, not only at the regime and opposition levels, but also at the level of all Syrian political forces.