Is There a US Policy Towards Syria?!

If we take a close look at the US’s behavior in Syria and the region in general over the last few years, we can recognize a somewhat repetitive pattern. This pattern is made up of different events and matters, when examined individually one might mistakenly conclude the above, that the main determinant of US policy towards Syria is confusion or that there is no policy at all.

The thing that reinforces the illusion of widespread confusion and absence of a specific policy stems from statements by US officials and sometimes former officials, or official and non-official statements, which are not exactly aligned and can sometimes be contradictory, with an added layer of just enough vagueness so different sides can understand the different statements completely differently, or two sides having two completely opposite understandings thereof.

Examples…

Before trying to understand the “why”, it could be useful to look at some examples:

• US presence in the northeast and in Syria started in its military form in September 2014, under the pretext of combatting ISIS, through the so-called “international coalition”. Pursuant to this “mission”, the US has supported the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as a local partner in the fight against ISIS. In Spring 2019, Trump announced that ISIS was “territorially defeated”, but that thousands of fighters remained in the region. This was preceded in December 2018 by what was supposedly a surprise announcement by then-president Trump that US troops would be withdrawn from Syria, which was followed by statements and comments from other officials to the contrary. Since then, there have been vague statements and actions regarding staying in Syria and withdrawing from it, which were received differently and got different reactions from the Syrian sides, and the same issue continues to this day.

Another aspect of the US’s presence in Syria and “support” of SDF, is that the US was coordinating with Turkey, and giving protection assurances to SDF as its partner by “mediating” with Turkey. In fall 2019 when a Turkish offensive in northeaster Syria seemed imminent, the US announced that it does not support the Turkish offensive. However, on October 6, 2019, US forces withdrew from the border areas, making way for Turkey to start its so-called “Operation Peace Spring” on October 9, 2019, to end up with Turkish control of a strip along the borders, from which the SDF was forced to withdraw.

During a discussion with senior US Department of State officials on October 10, that is one day after the start of the Turkish operation, one of the officials said: “Our position is that this was a mistake for Turkey to do, that we will try our very best to get this thing stopped and work from there, because we have very important work to do with the SDF, we have very important work to do with Turkey”. As for the relationship with SDF, US statements and actions have seemed to be supportive at times, but at the same time leaves a wide margin to maneuver, including at times stating that the US support for SDF is “limited to the framework of the war on ISIS”.

• US sanctions on Syria started officially a few decades back, but were greatly increased since 2011, ultimately reaching the infamous “Caesar Act” in June of last year, which has had the most catastrophic repercussions on the Syrian economy (the speed of collapse of the economy since imposing the Caesar Act has reached 34 times that of the years preceding the crisis). Officially, the US continues to hold the “strict” position that economic sanctions will not be lifted unless and until certain conditions are met. Nevertheless, there are entities and individuals here and there that get relieved of the sanctions, without specifying exactly why. Not to mention, indirect exceptions through things like the “Arab” gas pipeline project or economic activities between the regime and regional countries, which could easily be subject to action by the US under the “Caesar Act”, but have not been.
• “Normalization with the regime” (as some call it) by Arab states, which is exhibited through some recent attempts of rapprochement between the Syrian regime and some Arab regimes, most notably and recently steps by Jordan and the UAE. At the same time the US’s official position and statements have been that there will be no “normalization” with the regime and displeasure with these recent actions by some Arab regimes, particularly statements about the recent visit by UAE’s foreign minister to Damascus, including comments by the US’s Department of State spokesperson during a press briefing on November 9, when he was asked about the visit: “we are concerned by reports of this meeting and the signal it sends.  As we’ve said before, this administration will not express any support for efforts to normalize or to rehabilitate… I will leave it to our partners, I will leave it to our allies to characterize their position on Syria, their position on the Assad regime. When it comes to our position on the Assad regime… we will not normalize or upgrade our diplomatic relations with the Assad regime, nor do we support other countries normalizing or upgrading their relations”.

Is there a policy or is there not?

While the above examples are very simplified and each could be the subject of in-depth analysis and discussion, they are quite telling. Mainly, they illustrate a pattern of the way the US is dealing with the Syria file, that is by playing and building on contradictions between what is articulated or stated (whether officially or via media outlets) and what it actually does on the ground. There is even some level of contradiction or a margin of vagueness in the statements such that the different sides – Syrian, regional, and even international – can each have a completely different understanding, even completely opposite understanding.

So, to say the main determinant of US policy towards Syria is confusion or having no policy at all, is not completely incorrect, though that in itself is the policy, which contributes to the same thing the US has been trying and continues to do for years, but more so recently, which is something we have repeatedly argued before: trying to get everyone up against each other whether Syrian-Syrian, Syrian-regional, or regional-regional.

Thus, to determine whether or not there is a US policy towards Syria one should not look alone at what is stated whether officially or in the media, nor can one only look at the US’s actions on the ground, because more often than not, there are contradictions among those.

What is more important is to look at the results on the ground through a wider lens, which is the lens of the conflict at its strategic international level. Without this lens, it would be impossible to truly understand the real intentions from the different “tactics”. Furthermore, these tactics are designed mainly to mix up things, cause confusion, and get everyone preoccupied with the partial details to distract from the general strategic direction.

Within this direction, and regardless of the tools (initially military attrition, later economic attrition, then adding perpetuation of the de facto division and maintaining the fait accompli by giving (directly or indirectly) just enough support to the de facto authorities to remain in place in this state of destructive balance) are aimed to reach the same result, and that is at minimum ending Syria’s historical position and role in the region as a key, if not the key player in the face of “Israel” and related projects in the region. At best, from a US perspective, the result would be to end Syria’s existence as a geopolitical unit.

Zooming out to look at the region from a wider angle, with all the details of what has been happening over the last few years, including the “normalization” efforts, that is the one relating to the Zionist entity, the goal is to create a regional axis. Based on the targeted components to be included in this axis, the immediate objective is to encounter Iran and Turkey in the region, but behind them and more importantly for the US, the rising powers – more specifically, Russia and China – within the new international balance that is undergoing a significant change.

In this sense, it might be completely correct to say that there is no US policy towards Syria, because it is more accurate to say that there is a fixed policy towards the entire Middle East region derived from a comprehensive international policy in the context of the conflict with China and Russia. Is there a US policy towards Syria? Yes, of course, but as part of a broader policy, and this itself can explain what often appears to be confusion and contradiction.

(Arabic Version)