How to Prevent Detonating Northeastern Syria?

The easiest explanation is that the Autonomous Administration, during the last period, made a number of erroneous decisions, and carried out a number of erroneous practices, including repression, arrests, restrictions, and so on.

We say that this explanation is the easiest, not because it is wrong, but because it represents only the visible part of the iceberg. Before any attempt to touch on the unseen parts, the visible part must be recognized and seen, because it is the first point of reference in deducing the roots of the iceberg.

The Erroneous Practices and Decisions

Among the prominent examples of problematic and erroneous decisions that have become the talk of the street in the northeast and the Syrian public in general, is Decision 119, which included an increase in fuel prices. There was also the decision to close the crossing points between the northeastern regions and the regime-controlled areas, which lasted for several days. There are also the “forced conscription” practices within SDF, the demonstrations that protested against it, and the repression used against some of those demonstrations. There was also more recently the arrest of a journalist by kidnapping, before he was later released.

It is not possible to take an objective position from these practices without looking at what happened as they developed; meaning, looking at how the Autonomous Administration responded to people’s rejection of these practices and decisions.

One outstanding example in this context is the reversal of Decision 119 regarding raising fuel prices, which was retracted within 48 hours of its issuance under popular pressure. This is a positive sign there is a good degree of sensitivity of the Administration towards popular demands. It can also be said that something similar happened with regard to other decisions and practices, where most of the practices and decisions that provoked people’s ire and led to problems have been partially or completely retracted.

While it is true that someone who does not do any work does not make mistakes, and whoever works will most certainly make mistakes, it is also true that errors have levels, some of which may not be taken lightly, but must be scrutinized and know how they were pushed, especially in circumstances of this degree of danger and complexity.

Other Parts of the Iceberg

We described above the Administration’s mistakes and some of its actions that caused a strong popular reaction, as the tip of the iceberg, which usually extends very deep compared to the visible part of it.

What can be observed within these depths is the escalatory behavior of three sides: the US, Turkey, and the extremists within the regime, the actions of all of whom intersect to create more tension in the northeast.

The most influential and important element in the escalation among these sides may be the US.

Starting in October 2019, that is, with the partial US withdrawal from northeastern Syria, which took place in clear coordination with the Turks, who launched their aggression that they named “Spring of Peace” only three days thereafter, it became clear, even to those who thought that the US was their ally that this “ally” is at least unsafe, and ready to betray at any moment.

However, with time, other elements within the scene started to emerge and become clear: the Americans began to openly support specific formations and elements directly hostile to the Autonomous Administration, operating within its areas of control or trying to operate within those areas. This support extended from the political to financial and even military.

In the context, we witnessed a number of Arab tribes’ conferences, none of which brought together the Arab tribes as they claimed, but tried to use notables from here and there, based on political loyalty.

Among the Arab tribes’ conferences, we saw one indirectly sponsored by the US, another sponsored by SDF, a third sponsored by Turkey, and a fourth by the regime. Even Abu Muhammad al-Jolani held a meeting with Arab tribal leaders. Furthermore, there is almost no Syrian political alliance, whether opposition or loyalist, that does not include within its ranks some group that associates itself with the tribes, whether they are real or made-up.

Most of these conferences, which were held recently, were pushing towards creating and fueling an Arab-Kurdish ethnic conflict and putting it atop the conference agenda.

We believe that US action, in particular, is aimed at having everyone collide with everyone and paving the way for an “appropriate atmosphere” for withdrawal from Syria; the appropriate atmosphere, according to US understanding, is one of total uncreative chaos.

In parallel, the Turks are seeking to exploit the contradictions and loopholes to try to extend their influence over additional areas in the northeast. This does not mean extending direct military influence, because it has become unlikely that any additional large-scale operations will take place in that region, because not only the Americans are present there, but the Russians are as well. What is meant is an attempt to extend influence by weakening the Administration politically and increasing the weight of political forces close to Turkey and that could exist in the northeast. Perhaps within this particular context, there is a lot of talk that the next president of the Coalition will be a tribal figure from northeastern Syria.

The extremists within the regime are also doing their part in the process, where they use official and semi-official platforms to expiate the Autonomous Administration and equate it completely with the US. There is even talk about the necessity of resisting the Administration, reaching the point of militarily eliminating it. The danger in the matter is that this propaganda does not stop at the general political limits, but goes beyond that to ethnic incitement of an Arab-Kurdish conflict.

Where is the Exit?

What is certain is that these sides will continue their attempts to detonate the northeast, each according to its calculations and objectives. Certainly, the tasks of the Syrian forces that have no interest in an explosion are multifold, difficult, and complex tasks, but are certainly achievable if the necessary patriotic will exists.

In the same context, it may be said that among the main issues that we believe the Autonomous Administration should work on are three main ones:

First: Working to reduce errors and provocations to a minimum and, if possible, to zero. This requires strict internal discipline against the wrongdoers, and scrutiny of the quality and backgrounds of those errors, distinguishing between what is normal and what is not.

Second: Establishing a positive relationship between the Administration and popular pressure, and benefiting from the popular momentum and direct it to fight the major corruption figures within the Administration itself; this is a battle without which no subsequent success can be guaranteed.

Third: Speeding up the process of detachment from the US, because what is clear is that the Administration’s weakest points are those that link it to the US, and these are the same points that can become the points through which the US and others stab and hurt. It is also clear that it has become a paramount existential necessity to politically isolate those within the ranks of the Autonomous Administration who favor the US and who are hostile to anyone who stands historically in the face of the US. Detachment from the US does not mean in any way running to the regime, or even to the Russians, but rather means fortifying the situation in preparation for a comprehensive solution, through solid relations with the people and with the patriotic sides and forces in the area and in the country in general, which is possible, and circumstances now allow it more than ever.

(Arabic version)