Syria’s Independence and the Tale of First Security Council Veto

On February 14, 1946 the Security Council started its 19th meeting at 11:30 am in London, England. At the meeting were representatives from: Australia, Brazil, China, Egypt, France, Mexico, Netherlands, Poland, USSR, UK, and USA. On the agenda was a letter dated February 4, 1946, from the heads of the Lebanese and Syrian delegations to the Secretary-General. The representatives of Lebanon and Syria were invited to attend the meeting.

The USSR representative, Vyshinsky, summed up the three main points of the letter as follows: “That communication states, in the first place, that the presence, in Lebanon and Syria, of British and French troops is an infringement of the sovereignty of those States, and secondly, that the past has shown that their presence has been a menace to peace and security. The conclusion drawn is a request to evacuate the forces in question.”

The representatives of Lebanon and Syria then were given the chance to make their argument. The Lebanese representative started and stressed that as they are sovereign states, see that the presence of French and British troops on their territories illegal as it is not necessitated by a state of war or justified by existence of any agreements, treaties or understanding. He noted that the presence of troops “constitutes a permanent threat and a possibility of intervention in the internal affairs of Lebanon and Syria.” He urged the Security Council to “take a decision calling for the immediate, complete and simultaneous withdrawal of the foreign troops at present stationed on our territory.”

The representative of Syria, Fares al-Khoury then added some remarks, in which he referred to a 13 December 1945 agreement between France and the UK about maintaining forces in Syria and Lebanon to “guarantee security” there, noting that it was made without the participation of Lebanon and Syria, and that it did not provide a specified time or conditions for the withdrawal. He then added: “whose security do the parties intend to guarantee? There should be no doubt that internal security is solely the responsibility of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments. There should be no doubt, either, that external security is also the responsibility of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments… the war has ended, the nazi and fascist forces are ousted, and Syria and Lebanon are surrounded by States which are Members of the United Nations. What can entitle any other Government to assume the role of guarantor of security in that zone?” He then reiterated the Lebanese representative’s call on the Council to adopt a decision of withdrawal.

The French and UK representatives added their remarks, and throughout the discussions highlighted all the “wonderful things” they have done to help maintain security in the world, especially in the Middle East, and their “generosity” in supporting the independence of Syria and Lebanon, including their admission to the UN. They did not, and really could not argue that they should not withdraw their forces from Syria and Lebanon, but continued to make arguments that indirectly implied that it was not an urgent matter or even a dispute that requires a decision from the Council.

The Security Council members discussed the issue and the best course of action, including the role of the Council in the matter. However, none of the Council members could really disagree with the general concept that it is not acceptable for foreign troops to be present in the territory of a sovereign State without the consent of that State. Thus, all the members admitted that withdrawal must take place.

Where views varied was with regards to what the Council’s decision should be, more specifically, the main proposals focused on all four countries concerned to have negotiations in order to achieve the withdrawal and inform the Council of the outcome. These “negotiations” were the subject of the majority of the discussions, as the majority of countries stood behind a US proposal in which it was not clear what the negotiations would be about, while a smaller group insisted that these negotiations should be limited to the technical aspects and procedures of the evacuation of troops.

More Royalist than the King!

The USSR was the most prominent and aggressive in the second group and backed by both Egypt and Mexico, whose representatives made very specific proposals on the issue. The USSR representative, Vyshinsky stated it very clearly from the get-go: “The way out is very simple: no further negotiations of any kind,” and indicated that the Council should adopt a decision for calling for immediate evacuation.

In their usual manner that has not really changed since 1946, the representatives of the members (mostly Western countries) closer to the US position, tried to play with the language and keep it vague, and argued that the language implies this and that. It even got to the point where the representatives of Syria and Lebanon seemed willing to possibly accept a somewhat vague language, relying on what was said orally.

Here, Vyshinsky objected and insisted that any decision must “recommend immediate and simultaneous withdrawal of the troops” and the four countries concerned “should proceed to negotiate … technical details of the evacuation, and the date by which the last one should leave, and so on.” He insisted that the language should be clear so not to leave room for interpreting it as a negotiation on whether or not an evacuation should happen.

This pushed the French representative to say: “Mr. Vyshinsky is being more royalist than the king!”

It is very clear from the discussions taking place that the Council was somewhat divided into two groups: the first is the old imperialist powers, which were bitter about losing the privileges they had and trying within the framework of the new world order to utilize the new tools at their disposal to hold on to the same privileges they previously had; the second group was the new emerging socialist camp, led by the USSR and to some degree supported by the “victims of imperialism”, who found in the USSR an ally in this new world order.

In the end, there were three main proposals from Mexico and Egypt -- these two were consistent with the USSR position -- and one from the US, which kept the topic of negotiations vague. The first two did not get enough votes. In a last attempt to reach an acceptable decision, Vyshinsky proposed some amendments to the US proposal, all of which did not get enough votes.

The US proposal was then put to vote, and it received seven votes, which prompted the president of the meeting -- the representative of Australia -- to declare that the decision was carried. Here, Vyshinsky interjected and pointed out that a decision requires “an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members”, which is not fulfilled here as the USSR voted against the proposal.

This was the first veto in the Security Council’s history!

While the Security Council did not adopt a resolution with regards to the evacuation of the British and French troops from Syria and Lebanon, none of the members of the Council including the UK and France could deny that the withdrawal should take place. Additionally, none of the members could disagree with the notion that the presence of foreign forces in a sovereign State is not acceptable absent an agreement or request by the State. We suspect that this played a major role in the evacuation of the last occupying forces from both Syria and Lebanon a mere two months later.

(Arabic version)