Four Levels in Reading the Recent US Aggression

Hereinbelow, we will try to understand this aggression within four levels: two domestic (US), one international, and one related to Syria.

Domestic Level 1

At the domestic level, ordinary Americans might not know or care to know the details behind the recent aggression. All they know is that there is an economic problem that is comparable to the Great Depression and a pandemic that is ravaging through the US with over half a million deaths in less than a year.

Tangibly, Americans have not seen with the new administration changes or signs of change that could be promising of improvements in the near future. In fact, many are starting to get critical of the lack of concrete moves to improve the economy. At the same time, most Americans know how costly military operations are. Thus, the simple equation is that money spent on a military action is money that could be spent internally to improve lives of Americans by addressing the pandemic and the economy. Simple equation, simple reaction, and a great amount of confusion and rising anger.

An additional factor with Americans and the general negative response towards this aggression is that overall, Americans are increasingly getting tired of the US’s unnecessary wars. A growing number of Americans is becoming aware that these wars are not for the purpose of “defending” the US and its borders, especially that there has almost been no actual war on US soil probably since the Civil War, though some point to the attacks on Pearl Harbor, which is nearly 80 years ago. Consequently, Americans generally look unfavorably at US military actions and the large military presence abroad as being unnecessary.

There still remains, however, a segment of Americans who approve these kinds of moves, particularly with countries like Iran that have been demonized for decades and a stamp of “enemies of the US and its values” has been affixed thereto.

Domestic Level 2

At the political level inside the US, this move is receiving varying reactions. Generally, the Democrats criticized the move, while Republicans supported it. These general positions are not surprising based on the general approach each party is pushing for with regards to Iran and the issue of returning to the JCPOA (the Iran Nuclear Deal).

Analysts from different think tanks are somewhat all over the spectrum in their reading of the move, including the following:

• The move is an attempt to absorb those with more hawkish positions in Washington with regards to Iran and who vehemently oppose re-entering the JCPOA, by sending the message that the US remains tough on Iran. This can be explained more clearly by saying that the aggression came within the framework of the ongoing battle with Trump, and in an attempt to absorb and contain part of his “popular base”.
• Along with the above, the move is sufficient to send a message to Iran, but not a fatal blow that it would evoke escalation and undermine or threaten the chances of reaching an agreement through diplomatic means. This, however, requires speeding up the work on the diplomatic front with Iran, directly or indirectly.
• The move is part of the US’s attempt to increase its leverage in its negotiations about re-entering JCPOA, but that might backfire, so it would be best to not have the two matters linked.
• This type of action is a continuation of the pattern that the previous administration had adopted in terms of responding to Iranian attacks on the US or its allies in the region.
• The US message here is that it will not be pushed around, and it will respond. This response sends this message clearly, but without giving an excuse for escalation.
• The window of opportunity for effective negotiations to re-enter JCPOA is already very narrow, and this move could make it narrower or even completely shut it.
• This could be the beginning of a series of retaliatory moves from both sides.
• This will make it harder to convince opponents of the benefits of the US re-entering the JCPOA, because Iran continues to show that it will not back down from the regional contest with the US and its regional allies.

These are just a few examples of the reactions and readouts, and to some extent reflect one fact: the most influencing factor in the US’s foreign policymaking may be the internal division and domestic crisis above anything else, and the “ambiguity” surrounding the Biden administration’s approach to the region and policies with regards to different regional dossiers is manifested in practice by continuing the same previous policies in a large number of dossiers.

Internationally

Last week, Biden declared at the Munich Security Conference that “Diplomacy is back!” That was well-received by some of the US’s friends in the West, after four years of the Trump administration making one “undiplomatic” move after another.

A week later, Biden starts dropping bombs, which is a move that could undermine the prospects of successful negotiations with regards to the JCPOA, something that most EU countries have encouraged and wanted to see happen as soon as possible.

This move might also raise a few eyebrows in the West, which was somewhat optimistic about a different approach by the new administration through which it reintegrates itself back into the international community. In this context and keeping in mind that “actions speak louder than words”, some might start to wonder whether this is the “diplomacy” that Biden was talking about – one by which the US wants to be part of the international community but gain leverage politically through military actions.

If this is going to be the US’s approach to “correct” the damage made by the Trump administration to its international image and presence, perhaps some matters will require reconsideration, particularly some dossiers that especially the EU had clearly “put on the back burner” until Biden takes office, including the Syria file.

What about Syria?

Not unusual to the US, the sovereignty of states is not something with which it concerns itself. That is, to retaliate for something that happened in Iraq with military action in Syria, while being effectively an occupying military force in both, is nothing out of the ordinary for the US. This comes at a time when it is becoming increasingly noticeable that the new US administration has not made any statements about its Syria policy.

At the same time, US engagement in the efforts to push forward the political process towards the full implementation of UNSC Resolution 2254 would certainly be better than having the US outside sabotaging the process and delaying it further. However, for the political process to move forward towards full implementation, military action on the ground must stop, and a move like the one taken by the US a few days ago might be an indication of the US’s desire to prolong the “quagmire”. This aggression will only add more certainty to what we have repeatedly said, that is, those who are interested in reaching a political solution in Syria – Syrians and international actors – have to proceed towards that solution without waiting for the US.

(Arabic version)