Astana Should Move Beyond Itself, Quickly!

It is undoubtedly positive that the military battles have stopped; at least because this stops the bloodshed of Syrians who were getting killed by the dozens and sometimes hundreds on a daily basis. However, it is also positive because the cessation of the fighting secures a state of relative calm that paves the way towards an exit from the catastrophe, through a comprehensive solution to the crisis by fully implementing UNSC Resolution 2254.

There is no dispute between the supporters of the Astana process and its opponents, in that it was precisely what has allowed to secure this state of relative calm through a set of initiatives and actions, certainly among them the de-escalation zones.

From intense battles to attrition

During 2016 and what followed until the end of 2018, shattering strikes were directed at ISIS and its likes, primarily by the Russians. This, combined with the Astana track, gradually curbed the military conflict into what we now describe as almost a whole year passing without any mentionable battles.

With ending the intense battles phase, the scenario of ending Syria as a geopolitical unit with the militaristic tool, and the terrorist tool in particular, had been eliminated. However, the alternative scenario was ready before the end of the military battles, and here we mean the attrition scenario.

The various observation points and boundaries drawn by Astana were mainly intended to prevent the Syrian parties from continuing to kill each other. That intra-Syrian fighting was exploited by the extremists from the Syrian sides and behind them the West, which agrees with those either directly or through intermediaries, or intersect with them in interests.

However, the function of these barricades, with the end of the fighting operations, and with the escalating levels of economic sanctions and the selective method between lifting and tightening, has transformed and is transforming these barricades into Chinese walls, whose height is increasing day after another, among the different Syrian regions.

This is clearly evident in the hysteria that afflicts the West with any talk of crossings between Syrian regions, and in the parallel hysteria that is contradictory on its face but identical content-wise to the first hysteria, when talking about cross-border crossings.

The danger of “peacetime”!

If we try to focus on what is actually happening on the ground in the various Syrian regions, away from the debate and accusations, especially with regard to the Constitutional Committee and the political process, we will find that all Syrian regions have some clear commonalities:

First: The economic collapse includes all Syrian regions, and even though it can be more severe or less severe in one aspect in this or that region, the general situation is a state of total collapse.

Second: Just as the process of collapse is one, so too are its fundamental causes. There are the sanctions on the one hand, which do not spare anyone, even though the pressure resulting therefrom bears some differences from one region to another. There is also the dismemberment of the country, which distorts the normal economic cycle and creates a vacuum that is filled by opportunists with widespread plundering operations through import and export in light of exchange rates that are fluctuating on a daily basis.

There is also the dominance of great corruption, which is nearly identical in all regions of Syria, including details such as checkpoints and illegal dues, and up to the different types of major deals, especially import and export (and this is without even considering the black-market trading). On top of all that, and perhaps one of its fundamentals, “no sound rises above the sound of the battle”, which means that control in each region separately is the dominance of weapons in the first, second, and third place, and after that it might be possible to talk about “democracy”. This dominance of weapons is always intertwined with the dominance of great corruption, and this is the nature of things that people know, clearly and visibly.

Third: What has been common throughout the past year, and the last six months in particular, in the three Syrian regions, is that the number one activity and targeting – in the political sense – within the “phase of relative calm” is not the implementation of 2254, nor the comprehensive political solution, and also not an attempt to reconnect the country, but it is the “elections”. In this context, the controlling sides in each of the three regions present their own narrative about the necessity of holding elections (in response to popular needs and organizational necessities, or as a response to constitutionally-required matters, or as a tool in disputing legitimacy, and so on). It should always be remembered that such elections will only take place according to what we mentioned previously, that is, where “no sound rises above the sound of battle”.

In other words, the cessation of the war and the failure to reach a solution means the continuation of dominance of weapons in all regions of Syria, and it means an additional push towards partition, especially through controlling with the sanctions – tightening and easing, and by creating hypothetical “legitimacies” based on elections that take place in parts of Syria, and not in all of it, and under the dominance of weapons.

Moving beyond Astana

Undoubtedly, that the primary side concerned with preventing the division of Syria, reunifying it through the political solution, 2254, and through comprehensive radical change in the interest of the Syrians, are always the Syrians themselves and from all sides. This is what Kassioun repeatedly emphasized and continues to emphasize, and what it always represents in the political sense. Particularly, the concerned are the patriotic Syrians from the different sides, who are the ones that must unify their efforts against the extremists from the different sides as well. This is a clear matter and entrusts with the patriotic Syrians tasks and achievements to realize from which they cannot escape.

However, on the other hand as well, and with regard to the current global international conflict, one of its main burning spots being our country, what must be clear to Russia in the first place, and then to the rest of Astana sides, is that the three major achievements that have been realized are still completely reversible and threatened therewith if enough time lapses for that to happen. More specifically:

First: With regard to ISIS and similar terrorist factions, the process of eliminating them took place primarily at the hands of the Russians. Nevertheless, this latest phase of “relative calm” has witnessed the revitalization of ISIS cells in several places in Syria.

Second: As for the de-escalation zones, the stopping of the bloodshed therein, and the reduction of the level of violence, these same areas – or parts thereof (because the partition among the three regions in Syria today is not an exact reflection of Astana, but rather is contributed to with the continued presence of the occupying US forces in the northeast) and with the prolongation of the period of “relative calm” – are transforming, as mentioned above, into areas separated by Chinese walls that are getting higher day after day.

Third: As for the Constitutional Committee, which is undoubtedly the main pushing force behind its formation was Astana itself, we see through concrete experience that it will not reach anything within the current coordinates, and some have even used it as a distraction and diversion mechanism to escape from the essence of the political solution and the essence of UNSC Resolution 2254.

Fourth: The partitioning of the country in this way, including the disruption of the normal economic cycle, in addition to the blockade and the great corruption, all of this makes this relative calm a temporary timebomb, which we claim carries destructive effects that could be greater and more dangerous than everything that has happened thus far. This particularly so because any knowledgeable person does not lose sight of the fact that the Zionists in the first place, along with others, are trying in these very moments, above and under the table, to strike a fatal blow to the unity of Syria and the unity of its people with all possible tools – economic, national, political, cultural, etc., and in cooperation with the extremists who see the whole world through the lens of their petty, selfish, and narrow interests.

Conclusion

The policy of the US is constant and has not changed with regard to Syria at least since 2016, that is, since it has become quite clear that it is not possible for any side to “win militarily”. The US official and unofficial fraud and deception about moving from one administration to another, about reviewing policies, and about the lack of clarity, and so on, is something that should not deceive states, even if it deceives political analysts.

The US policy is the one that Jeffrey summarized: “low cost, great effect”. This is not a new policy but is the essence of the policy that had received the title of the “arms race” in the twentieth century.

All of this calls for careful and rapid thinking, of a qualitative shift, whether within or outside Astana, in order to actually push towards a political solution and towards stopping the collapse, otherwise everything that has been accomplished is reversible.

(Arabic version)