Nearly two years after the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s rule, the Syrian landscape remains bleak and difficult in its socioeconomic, political, and broader national dimensions. Its crises are growing deeper and more dangerous with each passing day. This is most evident in the economic and livelihood situation, where promises remain nothing more than promises, while harsh realities weigh heavily on more than 90% of Syrians, crushing them on a daily basis.

Alongside the economic and livelihood crisis, there is “Israel’s” continued encroachment on the country, its people, and its territory. There are also various international and regional interventions, including those of the IMF and the World Bank, which are working to impose their conditions in full on the country and its economy. Not to mention that the timid talk of “political participation” has, so far, remained just that: talk, while tendencies towards monopolizing power and excluding others continue to prevail.

The key phrase that defines the current situation is “reliance on foreign powers”. This includes pinning hopes on the lifting of sanctions; attracting private investment, both foreign and otherwise; and tying the stability of the country—and even the stability of the state apparatus itself—to external supplies and funding, which come at times and are cut off at others.

Not long ago, there were attempts to push Syrians into becoming militarily entangled in Lebanon, against the interests of both countries and both peoples, and for the benefit of the Zionist entity. The same applied to attempts to draw Syrians into military involvement in Iraq. It is not difficult to draw a connection between the refusal to become entangled in Lebanon and Iraq and the subsequent statements by Tom Barrack that attracting investment to Syria is “almost impossible”, whereas previously it had been possible—even guaranteed. Today, there is also growing talk of the possibility of military involvement in Yemen, with such involvement being linked to economic and investment projects and financial assistance.

What is certain in the above examples—and indeed in historical examples more broadly, both in Syria and elsewhere—is that losing a country’s economic and financial independence will inevitably lead to losing its national and political independence. The price of losing independence is paid by everyone, by society and those in power alike. This is precisely the direction emphasized in the “Common Principles” paper, issued following a meeting of five Syrian leftist parties in Damascus on Saturday, 7 November 2026.

For all these reasons, and to prevent the country from being driven towards the dark future currently being designed and implemented for it, there must be fundamental points of reference, foremost among them two essential principles:

First: We must definitively break with the idea of relying on external powers, whether regional or international, and instead turn our attention inwards, relying on our own society and the country’s domestic resources, primarily its human resources. This is not only possible; it is the only viable, available, and secure option. However, it requires redistributing national wealth in favor of Syrian society and putting an end to the widespread major corruption through direct societal oversight. The vehicle for such oversight must be genuine political participation. The starting point for achieving this is the unification of the Syrian people through a national unity government and an inclusive general national conference with full powers.

Second: In shaping our foreign relations, we must remain attentive to the major transformations taking place across the world. Above all, both as a matter of principle and of practical political calculation, we must recognize that the West as a whole, with the US at its forefront, is experiencing an unprecedented historical decline and retreat, and anyone standing on its side will decline with it and share in its losses.