Two Mirrors for the Syrian National Identity
Reem Issa Reem Issa

Two Mirrors for the Syrian National Identity

Last Saturday, the third round of the Syrian Constitutional Committee wrapped up its work in Geneva, and it does not seem to have produced anything new compared to the preceding two rounds. I will not talk here about the feasibility of this Committee, or more precisely, its expected contribution to the political process as a whole. This is not to avoid how problematic the issue is and the conflicting opinions about it, but simply because I myself do not have a definite opinion on whether or not this Committee will actually contribute to getting Syrians out of their crisis… although I hope it will.

What I will discuss is the idea that was “said” to have been the focus of discussions in this round, that is, the idea of the Syrian national identity – I say “said” because the discussions are confidential, and there is no way to verify what was actually discussed; this in itself is very strange, as the issue of the constitution concerns the future of all Syrians, so why do we not hear through live transmission what our “hypothetical representatives” are saying about our future and the future of our country?

Whatever it is, discussing the issue of the Syrian national identity is important after everything that we have gone through, whether the discussion will yield results at this point through the constitutional committee or at another time later.

Expected Sparring

To discuss this issue, I think it would be useful to divide it to two levels, which I will label: the first level ideological and the second level belonging.

Within the first level, we can expect an easy agreement on a fundamental issue which is Syria’s and Syrians’ enmity to the “Israeli” entity and their support of the Palestinian cause. However, we can also expect a long debate about several issues: 1) What is the position of Arabism in the Syrian national identity? Including the name of the republic, its army, and so forth? 2) What about other nationalities, their languages, their cultural rights, etc.? 3) What about Islam and its position within the Syrian national identity? What about other religions, the different sects, and the secular views?

I know that these issues are highly problematic, where someone who wants to turn the debate into a pointless argument can easily do so based on these issues. I do not have enough experience or knowledge to offer solutions and exits, nevertheless, my opinion can be summarized in two points: 1) We need constitutional language that recognizes Syria’s belonging to a cultural space that is Arabic-Islamic, but at the same time recognizes the diversity and richness of the Syrian society, whether at the national, religious, or cultural levels, in a way that it truly guarantees equal citizenship that is not marred by any kind of discrimination on the basis of race, gender, religion, or sect. 2) We need to move away from imposing ready-made ideological formulas as the identity for the state; meaning, moving away from formulas that preemptively push Syria into a specific national, religious, or class-based ideology – “capitalist or socialist”.

The Most Important Level

Although a thick and expected dust was raised and might be raised later about the aforementioned level, I do not think that it is the most important level.

The Syrian national identity, although in one of its aspects means our identity as Syrians relative to the other / the non-Syria, it also means our identity as Syrians belonging to a country that has a specific area of land, its institutions, its laws, its heritage, its history, its culture, and its symbols.

In other words, national identity has two basic aspects. Our identity as Syrians and as a Syrian state in the mirror of non-Syrians and other countries, and our identity as Syrians towards our state itself, our belonging to it and to this country, that is, us as a society before our “personal” mirror.

While it might be clear that there are many intersections between the two levels – e.g., in talking about equal citizenship – the belonging level is of special importance, primarily because it is not usually given enough attention. Constitutional drafting experiences post-crises – e.g., Egypt, Tunisia, and Sudan – attest that the bulk of the discussion has focused on the first aspect, which we called ideological, while the new constitutions did not witness quantum leaps from their predecessors when it comes to the second aspect: the belonging.

Obligations, but also Rights!

In order for the discussion not to be floating in space, I should clarify that what I mean by “belonging” in this context is the totality of mechanisms, laws, and constitutional articles that guarantee the citizen the material and spiritual basis to belong to the homeland in the sense that the belonging is a system of rights and obligations, and not only obligations. Belonging to the homeland, and through the greater part of the Syrian state history in its modern form, and for the greatest majority of Syrians, has always been equivalent to sacrifice, misery, muzzled mouths, nonexistent or very minimal political freedoms, and the constant daily struggle to secure decent livelihood, for whoever that is even available.

In this sense, the constitutional chapters relating to political, democratic, economic, educational, and cultural rights are also chapters to confirm the Syrian national identity, and the matter is not limited to the broad headings that usually come in the preambles of constitutions. Within these different chapters, we should look for the greatest amount of guarantees that achieve the principle of the sovereignty of the people, in a practical manner and not only as a general slogan.

Many Terms

Among the terms related to crystalizing the Syrian national identity, that is, crystalizing Syrians’ belonging to their country, are the constitutional principles and laws that guarantee their sovereignty and ability to effectively exercise power. This is not limited to what is called political freedoms, but extends further to the nature of elections, the relationship among the three authorities and distribution of powers among them, and also extends to the nature of the relationship and distribution of powers between the center and the peripheries.

Transforming the Syrian national identity from a mere slogan used to stay preoccupied or to bargain to a tangible issue that is linked to the concept of belonging to the homeland is a process that requires discussing the next constitution in its entirety starting from the principle of “the authority is for the people”, and with all the terms and details of this authority.

The national identity requires an in-depth look into how Syria can be a nation that nurtures all its citizens and provides them with a decent dignified living, advanced education, abundant health, real political freedoms, spaces for beautiful dreams… and spaces for their realization.